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In this paper fiscal policy is examined for an open economy characterised by unemployment 
due to efficiency wages. We allow for capital and firm mobility in a model where the 
government chooses the level of wage, source-based capital and profit taxation. The taxing 
choices of governments are analyzed in scenarios which differ with respect to the constraints 
imposed on the set of available taxes and on the mobility of firms. As a general result, the 
welfare loss from labour market imperfections increases when tax bases become 
internationally mobile, which suggests an increasing relevance of domestic labour-market 
reforms when tax bases become global. 
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 1 Introduction
It is a core result of the literature on tax competition that decentralised decision-making
by countries leads to an ineﬃcient choice of tax policies when the taxing ability of
governments is limited by geographic borders. In such an environment, the only feasible
form of capital taxation is source-based. However, this form of taxation typically distorts
the production decisions of ﬁrms. From this observation the literature often concludes
that the welfare losses from decentralised ﬁscal decision-making can only be avoided by
delegation of ﬁscal decisions to a supranational institution, or by the harmonisation of
tax rates.1 In general, the respective analyses presume competitive labour markets.
The initial hypothesis of the present contribution is that unemployment has a no-
table eﬀect on the gains and losses from tax harmonisation. This theoretical claim is
motivated by the evidence summarised in Table 1. Including all 15 EU-member states
and Switzerland into our sample, it can be noted from the ﬁrst row of Table 1 that 11
of these countries supported further measures of tax coordination in the recent past.2
While Luxembourg, Switzerland and Austria tended to oppose tax coordination, Bel-
gium and the UK took intermediate positions. Dividing our sample of 16 countries into
three (almost) equal-sized groups (5,5,6), according to the prevailing level of unemploy-
ment, we ﬁnd that the three countries which viewed tax harmonisation sceptically, plus
the Netherlands and Portugal, make up the group which is characterised by the lowest
unemployment rates. This suggests that a better national labour market performance
enables countries to pursue a competitive policy on the international capital market and,
hence, induces them to oppose measures of tax harmonisation. There will, of course,
be other determinants of a country’s attitude towards tax harmonisation. For example,
there is a recent literature which rationalises the view that especially countries with a
relatively large ﬁnancial sector may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to engage in competition for mobile
capital (Eggert and Kolmar 2002, Huizinga and Nielsen 2003). Rows three and four in
Table 1 provide support for this view.
In this paper, we concentrate on the impact of unemployment. Adopting the eﬃ-
ciency wage framework by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the paper makes three contribu-
tions: it represents, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst analysis of tax competition in an eﬃciency
1For excellent surveys of the tax competition literature with perfect labour markets see Wilson
(1999), Hauﬂer (2001a), Oates (1999). See also Fuest, Huber and Mintz (2003).
2Any indicator of a country’s attitude towards tax harmonisation is arbitrary to some degree. An
operational measure which we have used in Table 1 is the willingness to agree to the introduction of a
minimum tax on interest income. See European Commission (1998) and European Commission (2001).
For the purpose of this paper, tax harmonisation and tax coordination are regarded as synonyms.
1Criterion
Attitude towards sceptical intermediate positive
tax harmonization l, sw, a uk, b dk, fi, f, d, gr,
ir, i, nl, p, es, s
Unemployment low intermediate high
a, l, nl, sw, p dk, d, ir, s, uk b, fi, f, gr, i, es
Financial Intermediation:
– number of employees high intermediate low
i r ,l ,n l ,s w ,u k a ,b ,f ,d ,i d k ,f i ,g r ,e s ,p ,s
– value-added high intermediate low
a, b, l, sw, uk dk, d, i, nl, es fi, f, gr, ir, p, s
A-Austria, B-Belgium, DK-Denmark, FI-Finland, F-Frankreich, D-Germany, GR-Greece, IR-Ireland,
I-Italy, L-Luxembourg, NL-Netherlands, P-Portugal, ES-Spain, S-Sweden, SW-Switzerland, UK-United
Kingdom (for data sources see the Appendix A).
Table 1: Attitude to Tax Harmonisation, Unemployment, and Size of Financial Sector.
wage model with unemployment.3 In particular, the paper provides a workhorse model
for analysing issues of optimal taxation in the presence of labour market imperfections.
Moreover, our analysis indicates that ineﬃciencies on the labour market and ineﬃcien-
cies caused by tax competition are ‘additive’ in the sense that their adverse welfare
eﬀects mutually intensify each other. The reason is that governmental choice of capital
taxes in an open economy is generally constrained by the downward pressure on taxes
caused by tax competition. As a consequence, the scope for ﬁscal policy to counteract
the imperfections on the national labour markets is limited. Coordination in tax matters
is, thus, the more beneﬁcial the more pronounced the distortions on the domestic labour
market are. Our result, hence, rationalises the empirical observations of Table 1. Finally,
we distinguish a setting with mobile capital but immobile ﬁrms and a world in which
capital and ﬁrms can migrate. To our knowledge, the present paper is the ﬁrst which
allows for a characterisation of the economic mechanisms that determine the choice of
tax rates when there is unemployment with capital and ﬁrm mobility.
3Issues of optimal taxation in the presence of mobile capital and unemployment have previously been
analysed exclusively in collective bargaining frameworks. See, among others, Fuest and Huber (1999),
Boeters and Schneider (1999), Lorz and St¨ ahler (2001), Koskela and Sch¨ ob (2002b) and Richter and
Schneider (2001). Wilson (1990) analyses tax competition in an eﬃciency wage model, but presumes a
two-sector economy, in which a monitoring problem exists solely in the primary sector. Thus, workers
who do not ﬁnd a job in the primary obtain employment in the secondary sector. Accordingly, Wilson’s
analysis does not deal with the topic of interest of the present paper, namely the impact of unemployment
on the gains and losses from capital taxation and tax coordination in an open economy.
2The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the workhorse model of un-
employment and derives the political equilibrium in the absence of ﬁrm mobility. We
discuss the structure of the ﬁscal scenarios that we analyse at the beginning of Section 3
and then characterise ﬁscal policy in the presence of ﬁrm immobility. Section 4 extends
the analysis to a setting in which ﬁrms can migrate. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a small open economy which competes for mobile capital on an international
market, taking world-market prices as given. World capital supply is ﬁxed. To focus
on the impact of unemployment on the welfare eﬀects of a strategic use of tax policy
and tax harmonisation, identical countries are assumed. In the initial set-up ﬁrms are
immobile and their number is given.
The country under investigation is inhabited by a continuum of internationally im-
mobile and identical individuals. We allow individuals to choose their work eﬀort, i.e.
the qualitative component of labour supply, and suppose that its quantitative counter-
parts, that is participation and hours, are ﬁxed. Eﬀort choices are an employee’s private
information. Since providing eﬀort creates disutility, employees have an incentive to
deliver as little eﬀort as possible if no costs are associated with low eﬀort. For simplicity,
let us assume that eﬀort can only take two values, zero or the positive and exogenously
given level required by ﬁrms. To provide employees with an incentive not to shirk and
to deliver the required eﬀort, a ﬁrm attempts to pay a wage above the wage paid by
other ﬁrms. The wage diﬀerential generates a loss to a worker who is caught providing
too little eﬀort and ﬁred for doing so. The desire of each individual ﬁrm to exceed the
equilibrium wage results in an eﬃciency wage in excess of the market clearing level. This
entails unemployment. Thus, in equilibrium the possibility of not being employed due
to a job loss replaces the wage diﬀerential as the incentive which induces workers to
provide the required level of eﬀort.
In line with the approach which has generally been employed in the analysis of
optimal taxation in the presence of labour market imperfections, unemployment takes
the form of the labour supply of each individual worker only being in demand to a
certain extent. Accordingly, individuals are identical not only ex ante but also ex post.
This simpliﬁcation allows to model the government’s optimisation problem in terms of
a representative agent.4
4See, for example, Fuest and Huber (1999), Koskela and Sch¨ ob (2002b), Richter and Schneider
(2001), and Kleven and Sørensen (2003).
3Government
In each country a national authority (government) uses a source-based tax, ts, on capital
k, wage taxation, tw, and a tax on proﬁts in order to ﬁnance the public good, g,a n d
unemployment beneﬁts, B.L e tn depict the employment rate in the economy and assume
that each individual supplies one unit of labour but cannot be fully employed due to
the monitoring problem. Using the private good as the numeraire and formulating our
discussion in terms of unit taxation, the public budget constraint is




where tp is the revenue from proﬁt taxation.5
Households
As in the original model by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), individuals are risk-neutral,
inﬁnitely lived and discount future payments with the rate R, R>0. They receive
interest income for each unit of their capital endowment at the going world interest rate
which equals the discount rate.6 The instantaneous utility, U, of an individual consists of
the monetary income and public good consumption, g, less the disutility from eﬀort, e,
which either conforms to the level required by ﬁrms, ¯ e>0, or equals its minimum
level, e = 0. If an individual is employed, she will obtain the net wage, w − tw, receive
the return from the capital endowment, and any proﬁts net of proﬁt taxation, π.T h e
instantaneous utility of an individual who provides the required level of eﬀort can, hence,
be expressed as:
U (¯ e)=( w − t
w)+Rk+ π − ¯ e + g. (2)
A job loss can occur for two distinct reasons. Individuals might shirk and are caught
doing so with probability c per unit of time. Alternatively, there might be an exogenous
shock which induces the ﬁrm to dismiss workers. The respective probability for a job
loss is b. The probabilities b and c are suﬃciently small, implying that the time periods
under consideration are short, such that bc ≈ 0. Accordingly, the expected life time
utility of an employed non-shirker, V en, can be expressed as V en (¯ e)R = w − tw − ¯ e +
5Since our focus is on the eﬃciency properties of the optimal tax structure we will, in line with the
previous literature (e.g., Koskela and Sch¨ ob, 2002a, Koskela and Sch¨ ob, 2002b), focus on tax structures
at given levels of g and B.
6The model implies that all individuals have the same ownership stake in domestic ﬁrms which are
fully owned by residents. This allows to concentrate on the eﬃciency eﬀects of taxation in an open
economy with unemployment and makes tax exportation irrelevant. See Huizinga and Nielsen (1997)
for a discussion of tax policy with cross-ownership of ﬁrms.
4Rk+ π + g + b(V u(¯ e) − V en (¯ e)), where V u(¯ e) is the utility from being unemployed,
which may depend on the choice of eﬀort. Solving for V en (¯ e) yields:
V
en (¯ e)=
U (¯ e)+bV u(¯ e)
b + R
. (3)
A shirker exerts an eﬀort level of e = 0, also in any future job, and loses the job with
probability b + c, but is otherwise identical to a non-shirker. The discounted utility
stream of an employed shirker V es (0) is then given by:
V
es (0) =
w − tw + Rk+ π + g +( b + c)V u(0)
b + c + R
. (4)
An unemployed individual does not receive wage income and incurs no disutility from
providing eﬀort. The unemployed receives beneﬁts, B, in addition to capital and any
proﬁt income.7 Otherwise, the instantaneous utility is independent of the employment
status.
The endogenously determined probability that a worker who has lost the job obtains
a new one, the job acquisition rate, is denoted by a. The discounted utility stream of
an unemployed non-shirker V u(¯ e), who also provides the required level of eﬀort ¯ e in a
future job, therefore, is
V
u(¯ e)=
B + Rk+ π + g + aV en (¯ e)
a + R
. (5)
The utility stream for a shirker is deﬁned accordingly. The wage which warrants a
positive level of eﬀort by workers is deﬁned by V en(¯ e) ≥ V es(0). Solving the equality for
w yields:
w = B +¯ e +
¯ e
c
(a + b + R)+t
w. (6)
The eﬃciency wage is independent of capital income, proﬁts and public good consump-
tion because variations in these variables aﬀect the utility from shirking and providing
eﬀort equally.
7In the present setting, positive transfers to unemployed, called unemployment beneﬁts, cannot be
derived as a consequence of optimal government behaviour. However, unemployment beneﬁts are a fact
of real life, and we have included them into our analysis for this reason. As long as there is a public
sector revenue requirement, the level of unemployment beneﬁts does not aﬀect our conclusions in a
world without ﬁrm mobility. In the presence of ﬁrm mobility (see Section 4) some predictions require
an upper bound on unemployment beneﬁts. Thus, we assume a positive level of transfers to unemployed
throughout the paper.
5A steady-state on the labour market requires that inﬂows into and outﬂows from
unemployment are equal. Since labour supply is normalised to unity unemployment
(or the unemployment rate) u is given by u =1− n. Because, moreover, no worker
shirks in equilibrium, the steady-state equilibrium condition is b(1−u)=bn = a(1−n).
Substituting for a in equation (6), and thus assuming that the probability of a job loss
is determined endogenously, yields:










The eﬃciency wage rises with unemployment beneﬁts B, the required level of eﬀort ¯ e and
the interest rate R, since variations in these variables imply that the utility from shirking
increases relative to that of non-shirking. Moreover, as previously shown by Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), a ﬁnite wage requires a positive unemployment rate u =1− n.
For later use it is helpful to explicitly compute the utility stream from employ-
ment, V en(¯ e), and unemployment, V u(¯ e), as functions of the exogenous variables. Sub-
stituting V u(¯ e) from equation (5) into the expression for V en(¯ e) from equation (3) – or



















In equilibrium, the (discounted) utility stream from being employed and not shirking
exceeds the utility of an unemployed worker by the present value of the disutility of ¯ e/c,
which a shirker – who is ﬁred with probability c –d o e sn o ti n c u r .
Production
There are many identical ﬁrms which use capital, k, and eﬀective labour, υ :=¯ en,a s
inputs. The production function f (υ,k) can be interpreted as representing the technol-
ogy of a single ﬁrm or as the aggregate production function of a set of identical ﬁrms. It
is homogeneous of degree m ≤ 1i n{υ,k}, for fii < 0 ∀i = υ,k, where subscripts denote
partial derivatives. Implicitly, m<1 presumes the use of a third factor of production
such as land which gives rise to pure proﬁts. Accordingly, our subsequent analysis will
distinguish between the two cases of zero and positive proﬁts. The Euler theorem then
implies
  := υf υυ + kfυk ≤ 0,β := υf kυ + kfkk ≤ 0,ω := f
2
υk − fυυ fkk ≤ 0, (9)
6where fkυ = fυk from Young’s theorem. The equalities in (9) will hold if the pro-
duction function is linear homogeneous in υ and k, while the inequalities will ap-
ply if it exhibits decreasing returns to scale. Let us assume, furthermore, that cap-
ital and eﬀective labour are complements.8 Firms maximize after-tax proﬁts π :=
max[f (υ,k) − wn− (R + ts)k − tp]. Using (7) in the proﬁt deﬁnition, we obtain the
following ﬁrst-order conditions









w =0 , (10a)
(k) : fk − R − t
s =0 . (10b)
Since unemployment is given by u =1− n and because the marginal product of capital
and labour depends on unemployment and capital input, the model implies that unem-
ployment, capital input and the eﬃciency wage are determined jointly in equilibrium.
Let us now determine the response of ﬁrms to a change in taxation. Inspection
of (10) already shows that tp has no substitution eﬀect on the factor demand decisions.
Diﬀerentiating (10) and the deﬁnition of net proﬁts, having substituted for the eﬃciency












































We may deﬁne for convenience H := bfkk + c ¯ eω (n − 1)
2 < 0, where the inequality
follows from (9). Applying Cramer’s rule to (11), and maintaining the assumptions used




fυk (n − 1)
2 < 0,n tw = −
c
¯ eH






b − c ¯ ef υυ (n − 1)
2 
< 0,k tw =
c
H
fυk (n − 1)
2 < 0,
πts = −k<0,π tw = −n<0, (12)
and short inspection shows that ntp = ktp =0 ,π tp = −1, which is suggestive from the
arguments given prior to (11).
8Hence, fij > 0 ∀i  = j = υ,k. This assumption is fulﬁlled for standard production functions, such
as Cobb-Douglas and CES.
7Political Equilibrium
The government in each country maximizes the average discounted utility of an individ-
ual nV en+(1− n)V u subject to the per-capita revenue requirement (1), taking as given
private sector actions and the tax rates chosen by the other countries.9
Let us denote the vector of policy instruments by x :=( ts,t w,t p). We may then write
the Lagrangian for the government in the small country as
L(x,λ)=nV
en +( 1− n)V
u − λ
 





where λ is the Lagrange parameter on the revenue constraint. Using (8) to substitute
out for V en and V u in (13) we arrive at
L(x,λ)=























After diﬀerentiation we obtain the following ﬁrst-order conditions





b ¯ en ts +( n − 1)2 (cπ ts +¯ eRn ts)
c(n − 1)2R
+ λ(nts(B + t
w)+t
skts)+λk =0 , (15b)
Ltw =
b ¯ en tw +( n − 1)2 (cπ tw +¯ eRn tw)
c(n − 1)2R
+ λ(ntw(B + t
w)+t
sktw)+λn =0 , (15c)
where we have used the result ntp = ktp = 0 from the discussion of the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order
conditions (10) and πtp = −1 in the derivation of (15a).10 The interpretation of (15a) is
straightforward. A marginal increase in the proﬁt tax reduces net private consumption
by exactly the present value of the public revenue gained. If, however, tp is bounded,
then Ltp > 0 will hold, resulting in λ>1/R. The argument is that the marginal costs
of public funds, measured by λ, increase when public expenditure exceeds the revenue
from proﬁt taxation. In this case, the equilibrium value of λ is given by the ﬁrst-order
conditions (15b) and (15c), according to which the government trades the change in
‘private’ utility of residents (given by the fractions) against the utility from an increase
9Since payoﬀs do not change over time, the maximisation of the weighted sum of instantaneous util-
ities from employment and from unemployment is equivalent to maximising discounted utility streams.
10The assumption that labour and capital are complements is a suﬃcient but not a necessary condition
for the existence of an interior solution for ts,t w. To see this, use the result that λ ≥ 1/R and (12)
in (15b) and (15c).
8in tax revenue caused by a change in tw and ts. The latter is evaluated at the equilibrium
level of λ.
Using the results given by (12) in equations (15) yields the set of ﬁrst-order conditions
which we employ subsequently to characterise the tax policy chosen by the government
of a small country in a world with tax competition and unemployment:










tsb + c(n − 1)















where we use α := b +( n − 1)
2 R>0 in (16) for notational convenience.
3 Nationally optimal tax rates
In this section we characterize the tax structure under the assumption that ﬁrms are
immobile. Initially, we presume that proﬁt taxation contributes to tax revenues. As a
benchmark, Proposition 1 describes the tax structure for a setting in which proﬁts, cap-
ital and labour can be taxed. Because the proﬁt tax is non-distortionary in the absence
of ﬁrm mobility, the best that policy can do is to replicate this tax scenario. Against this
benchmark, we can then discuss the factors that inﬂuence utility of the representative
agent. Proposition 2 summarises our ﬁndings for a setting in which the government
is constrained in the choice of wage taxation. Subsequently, we analyse tax equilibria
either in the absence of proﬁts or a tax on proﬁts. Proposition 3 summarises the ﬁndings
for a standard zero proﬁt economy. Since the availability of optimal proﬁt taxation rests
on the strong assumption that ﬁscal authorities have available the necessary information
to calculate the proﬁt tax base, Proposition 4 focuses on an economic environment in
which this tax not present. In Section 4 we reduce the level of abstraction further by
allowing for ﬁrm mobility to test the robustness of the results discussed in the previous
literature. This allows to gain insights into the economic forces that shape the choice of
tax rates when ﬁscal decision-making is decentralised in a world where capital and ﬁrms
are internationally mobile and the economy is characterised by unemployment.
For the scenario in which the government has control over the entire set of taxes and
ﬁrms are immobile it is possible to establish:
9Proposition 1 If the government in a small country with immobile ﬁrms is able to
choose tp,t s,a n dtw, then it will not use the source-based capital tax and will subsidise
wages in an eﬃciency wage setting.
Proof: To prove the ﬁrst part of the Proposition, take a pair {ts,t w} such that the ﬁrst-
order conditions (16b) and (16c) are fulﬁlled. At that point we know fkk/(¯ ef υk)Lts +
Ltw = 0 must hold. We then solve this expression to obtain
λRt
s =( 1− λR)β. (17)
We ﬁnd from (16a) that λ =1 /R when proﬁt taxation is possible and, from (9), we have
β<0 when gross proﬁts are positive. Inspection of (17) then shows that the government
chooses not to tax mobile capital at source. To prove the second part, we use λ =1 /R
and ts =0i nLtw,w h i c hg i v e s
c(n − 1)
2 t
w = −cB (n − 1)
2 − ¯ eα.
The only solution is tw < 0 as required by the proposition. 
The government does not use the source-based capital tax in the presence of proﬁt
taxation in order to avoid the distortion of international capital allocation. Thus, intro-
ducing the constraint ts = 0 would not change taxing choices.
The government will neither tax wages, given that the receipts from proﬁt taxation
suﬃce to ﬁnance public expenditure. A tax on wages raises unemployment while proﬁts
can be taxed without such adverse consequences. Accordingly part of the revenue from
proﬁt taxation is used to subsidise wages. The explanation is that a wage subsidy
increases eﬀective labour input at a given gross wage, thereby mitigating the distortion
on the domestic factor market.11 Also notice that a wage subsidy is preferable to a
capital subsidy since the latter would shift income to foreign capital owners. There arise
no such eﬀects for a wage subsidy, given the immobility of labour.
A result akin to the ﬁnding summarised in Proposition 1 has been derived by Koskela
and Sch¨ ob (2002b, Prop. 2) for a collective wage bargaining framework. The authors
can, furthermore, show that the wage subsidy suﬃces to eliminate unemployment and
interpret this result as a conﬁrmation of the ﬁnding by Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1978) that
the output of a price maker should be subsidised until the market price equals marginal
11The ﬁnding that ‘...wagesshouldbesubsidized, using whatever (pure) proﬁts can be taxed away’
(Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, p. 440) for a closed eﬃciency-wage economy with a given capital stock can
thus be conﬁrmed for an open eﬃciency-wage economy characterised by capital mobility.
10costs in a ﬁrst-best world.12 Accordingly, if the tax rate on proﬁts is chosen optimally, the
government can achieve the ﬁrst-best allocation in a collective bargaining set-up. This
is not feasible in the present shirking framework since the absence of unemployment is
incompatible with a positive level of eﬀort, due to the informational asymmetry about
the worker’s eﬀort choice.
Richter and Schneider (2001) also analyse a mechanism of collective wage determi-
nation. Assuming that taxes are set prior to wages, a capital subsidy will raise output
and employment only if a higher capital input reduces the market power of the owners
of labour.13 In such a case, the capital subsidy has positive employment consequences
for two reasons: ﬁrst, the marginal product of capital rises and, second, the wage falls.
Thus, it becomes worthwhile to incur the distortion of international capital allocation.
In the present eﬃciency wage framework, aggregate labour demand determines the net
wage, which has to be such that it guarantees a positive level of eﬀort (cf. equation (7)).
However, the net wage is not directly aﬀected by the capital choices of ﬁrms. This ex-
plains why capital should not be subsidized in the present model. A capital subsidy is
dominated by a wage subsidy.
Assume next that the government is unable to tax wages. We then get:
Proposition 2 If the government in a small country with immobile ﬁrms is able to
choose tp such that net proﬁts π remain positive while the use of wage taxation is re-
stricted, then it will subsidise capital in an eﬃciency wage setting.
Proof: To prove this proposition take a pair {tp,t s} such that the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions (16a) and (16b) are fulﬁlled. Using (16a) to substitute out for λ in (16b) and
solving the resulting expression for ts at tw = 0, taking into account fυk > 0, we obtain
t
s = −
fυk (Bc(1 − n)2 +¯ eα)
b − c¯ efυυ(1 − n)2 < 0.

The intuition behind the above proposition is that the tax on proﬁts ﬁnances the
government’s entire expenditure for the public good and unemployment beneﬁts. In
the absence of the wage tax, the government cannot directly alleviate the unemploy-
12Related, Myles (1989) and Konishi (1990) show that ﬁscal policy can also be used to counteract
the eﬃciency losses generated by imperfect competition on output markets. Konishi (1990) shows in a
model where a competitive sector produces intermediate goods for a free-entry Cournot oligopoly that
welfare can be raised by the taxation of intermediate goods. In contrast, however, the tax system should
reduce the externalities caused by the monitoring problem on the labour market in our model.
13If taxes and wages are determined simultaneously, the tax on capital (labour) will be zero (negative).
See also Boeters and Schneider (1999) and Fuest and Huber (1999).
11ment problem by a wage subsidy. Although a capital tax distorts international capital
allocation, subsidising capital is preferable to abstaining from such a policy because it
raises labour demand, nts < 0. Hence, Proposition 2 demonstrates that the gain from a
capital subsidy due to lower unemployment more than compensates the costs in terms
of a distortion in capital allocation.14
The analysis so far has been based on the assumption that revenues from proﬁt
taxation are positive. Assume next that the allocation described in Proposition 1 is not
feasible because ﬁrms do not make proﬁts. Then, the following result can be established:
Proposition 3 Assume that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale.
Then, the government in a small country characterized by immobile ﬁrms and eﬃciency
wages does not use the source-based capital tax and taxes wages to ﬁnance the revenue
requirement.
Proof: Gross proﬁts are zero when the production function is constant returns to scale,
implying that (9) holds with equality. Inspection of (17) then shows that ts = 0, implying
that wage taxation is used by the government to fulﬁl the public revenue requirement
in (1). 
The intuition for Proposition 3 is that a distortion of international capital allocation
remains undesirable. However, in contrast to the assumptions on which Proposition 1
is based, the government has to tax wages in order to ﬁnance its outlays, despite the
positive wage and negative output consequences of a tax on labour income. A wage tax
is preferable to a tax on capital for two reasons: ﬁrst, a capital tax distorts international
capital allocation, while there are no such eﬀects for immobile labour. Second, a tax
on wages raises the eﬃciency wage (cf. equation (7)), entailing a fall in employment.
Lower employment, in turn, reduces wages. Thus, the negative impact of the wage tax
is mitigated. Since capital is perfectly mobile, a capital tax would not have such a price
eﬀect.
The results summarised in Proposition 3 may be related to a ﬁnding by Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) according to which the market equilibrium will maximise expected welfare
if labour is the only input, the production function is linearly homogeneous and unem-
ployment beneﬁts are zero. This is the case because the zero proﬁt constraint implies
that all economic surplus accrues to workers, while the absence of any distortionary gov-
ernment activity ensures that the surplus is maximised. In our setting, the government
needs to obtain revenues. Hence, taxes exist. However, the non-distortionary proﬁt tax
14If, however, capital and labour were substitutes, fυk < 0, contrary to our assumption, labour
demand would decline with a capital subsidy. In this case, capital would be taxed, since this distortion
of capital allocation would help to lower unemployment.
12is unavailable by assumption. Accordingly, starting from the market equilibrium with-
out taxes as reference point, the least distortionary tax has to be selected to fulﬁl the
government’s revenue need. This is the tax on wages, despite its adverse labour market
consequences, because the price eﬀect of lower demand only occurs for the immobile
factor labour but not the mobile one capital.
The last scenario to be investigated in this section is one in which proﬁts are positive
but cannot be taxed. We then have:
Proposition 4 Assume tp =0and that gross proﬁts are positive. Then, the government
taxes capital at source in an eﬃciency wage world with immobile ﬁrms, even when the
country is small and the country is faced by an inﬁnite elastic supply response on the
world capital market.
Proof: Recall that in expression (9) the inequality sign applies when gross proﬁts are
positive and that λ>1/R when tp is bounded. Then, (17) can only be fulﬁlled for ts > 0
as required by the Proposition. 
The result is interesting for two reasons. First, since the government subsidises wages
in the presence of proﬁt taxation, an immediate implication of Proposition 4 is that
welfare is lower in the case of restricted proﬁt taxation. Second, Proposition 4 at ﬁrst
sight stands in contrast to the results derived in Razin and Sadka (1991) and Bucovetsky
and Wilson (1991). These models are based on a constant returns to scale production
function and demonstrate that a small country, which faces an inﬁnitely elastic supply
of capital on the world market, taxes wage income when the only tax on capital is
source-based. The contrast in results is due to the fact that proﬁts are positive in our
model, and the economic intuition can be explained as follows. An increase in source-
based capital taxation drives capital out of the country until the marginal productivity
of capital equals its tax inclusive costs. Hence, wages and proﬁts adjust in the present
model. The argument clariﬁes that, in principle, the wage eﬀect of an increase in source-
based capital taxation can be replicated by a wage tax. However, wage taxation avoids
the loss in production eﬃciency caused by source-based capital taxation. This makes
intuitive that governments choose not to tax capital at source in models in which the
level of proﬁts is zero. In the present model, an isolated increase of the source-based
capital tax also causes a capital outﬂow and induces a loss in production eﬃciency.
Here, however, the tax burden of source-based capital taxation is partly born by proﬁts.
Hence, the source-based capital tax acts as an indirect tax on proﬁts and wage income,
which explains why this tax is used in the absence of a direct proﬁt tax, even in a small
open economy. This suggests that it is not the presence of labour market imperfections
13per se which generates a positive source-based capital tax in the ﬁrst place, but the
existence of untaxed proﬁts.
In the related literature, Richter and Schneider (2001, Prop. 9) conclude in a model
with collective wage setting that governments will tax capital if wages are not decreasing
with capital. However, the government may ﬁnd it attractive to (implicitly) restrict wage
claims by subsidising capital in an environment where the wage rate decreases with the
capital employed in ﬁrms. Moreover, Koskela and Sch¨ ob (2002b, Prop. 3) demonstrate
in a model of wage bargaining that we should observe source-based capital taxes if it is
not proﬁtable to restrict the power of unions through a source-based capital subsidy.
Turning to the optimal level of wage taxation in our model, intuitively, two counter-
acting eﬀects are relevant for the government’s choice. First, increasing the wage tax at
a given level of public spending allows to reduce the source-based capital tax. Second,
wage taxation increases the eﬃciency wage which will lead to a higher level of unem-
ployment and, at the same time, an increasing part of proﬁts will not even be taxed
indirectly. We are not able to obtain unambiguous results with respect to the sign of the
wage tax in a model which encompasses both positive and negative eﬀects from wage
taxation.15
We may now summarise our discussion with a concluding Proposition on the welfare
implications of tax harmonization:
Proposition 5 Starting from an equilibrium without tax coordination, a simultaneous
increase of the source-based capital tax in all countries is welfare improving in an eﬃ-
ciency wage economy with immobile ﬁrms, given the available taxes.
Proof: Recall that world capital supply is given. Hence, if all countries are uniﬁed in
a single country, then the source-based capital tax will be lump-sum. However, Propo-
sition 1 clearly demonstrates that ﬁscal authorities choose not to levy the source-based
capital tax in scenarios with decentralized tax setting when the proﬁt tax is also avail-
able. Since ﬁscal authorities are not indiﬀerent in their ﬁscal choices, the openness of
a country and, thus, the degree of tax competition has an eﬀect on the tax structure
chosen by each government, as required by the Proposition. 
In models of tax competition with competitive labour markets the intuition for the
welfare enhancing impact of a coordinated increase in source-based capital taxation is
that a simultaneous tax increase in all jurisdictions prevents the tax-driven reallocation of
15For a given source-based tax ts > 0 according to Proposition 4, from (16b) and (16c) the wage tax











, which cannot be signed since
the term in curly brackets is negative for positive gross proﬁts from (9).
14capital. In the presence of unemployment, the positive welfare eﬀects of tax coordination
are strengthened since coordination of capital taxation not only allows for a welfare
enhancing introduction of a source-based capital tax but also enables the government to
reduce wage taxation and thereby to increase employment. In this sense, labour market
imperfections and the mobility of tax bases are ‘additive’ in their eﬀects on welfare.
One might also interpret Proposition 5 as indicating the existence of a double dividend
from tax coordination. Accordingly, measures of international tax coordination are not
a substitute for reforms of domestic labour markets. Instead, globalisation of tax bases
stresses the need for such reforms.
4 Firm mobility
This section extends the model outlined in Section 3 by introducing ﬁrm mobility. The
extension takes into account the empirical feature that not only capital but also ﬁrms
migrate across borders. Moreover, the results of the previous section depend to a large
extent on the availability of the proﬁt tax. However, this tax will no longer be lump-
sum in the presence of ﬁrm mobility and, accordingly, increasing the tax has adverse
consequences on employment which are absent without ﬁrm mobility. In this section we,
therefore, examine the explanatory power of the previous literature on tax competition
which often does not distinguish between ﬁrm and capital mobility.16
Assume that ﬁrms are guaranteed a ﬁxed level of proﬁts π on the world market. Given
perfect international ﬁrm mobility, net proﬁts earned by ﬁrms in the small country under
consideration have to equal π. Otherwise a reallocation of ﬁrms would be proﬁtable.
Hence, the locational choice by ﬁrms can be described by the arbitrage condition π = π.
In a world without ﬁrm mobility, employment, capital and the level of proﬁts are
determined endogenously. In the presence of ﬁrm mobility the number of ﬁrms operating
in the economy replaces proﬁts as an endogenous variable. Let us denote the number
of ﬁrms by κ. The equilibrium of the economy is determined by appropriately adjusted
equations (7), (10a), (10b) and the arbitrage condition π = π (cf. Appendix B for the
detailed calculations).
16Exceptions are Richter (1994), Wellisch (1995), Richter and Wellisch (1996) as well as Genser and
Hauﬂer (1996). The focus in these models, however, is on economic environments where tax revenues
are used to ﬁnance local public inputs, or on commodity taxation while labour markets are assumed to
be competitive. International household mobility can also severely change the structure of the taxing
problem. See the detailed discussion in Burbidge and Myers (1994) and Wellisch (1994).
15We can then express the Lagrangian for the government as:
L(x,λ)=nκV
en +( 1− nκ)V
u − λ
 






where λ is the Lagrange parameter on the revenue constraint. We use the expression for
the utility stream of a non-shirker to substitute out for V en and V u in (18), exploit the
comparative statics derived in Appendix B (see (A.5)) after diﬀerentiation, and obtain
the following conditions:
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where we deﬁne γ :=( κn−1)2 > 0 and make use of (9). In the previous analysis, we have
diﬀerentiated between constant and diminishing returns to scale. Notice, however, that
this distinction is not an illuminating one in the presence of ﬁrm mobility since otherwise
proﬁts would be tied down by a technological constraint to π =0a n dt oπ =¯ π by a ﬁrm
mobility restriction. Accordingly, we concentrate on a setting with diminishing returns
and positive proﬁts, i.e. ¯ π = π>0. This implies  ,ω,β < 0 from (9). We obtain
from (19a)-(19c):
Ltp −
¯ e(cπ + υR)ωγ + b(υ¯ eω + fkkπκ)
υω(bυ +( cπ + υR)γ)
Ltw =0 , (20a)
Ltp −
¯ e(cπ + υR)ωγ + b(υ¯ eω + fkkπκ)
¯ ek(cπ + υR)ωγ + b(υ¯ ekω + πβκ)
Lts =0 . (20b)
The simultaneous solution of equations (20) characterises the government’s choice
when all tax rates are available. As a result we obtain Proposition 6, which is the
analogue to Proposition 1:
Proposition 6 If the government in a small country with mobile ﬁrms is able to choose
tp,t s,t w, it will not levy the source-based capital tax in an eﬃciency wage economy.
16Moreover, if unemployment beneﬁts B are suﬃciently low, the wage tax will be strictly
positive.
Proof: The simultaneous solution of (20) is given by
t
s = 0 (21a)
t
p =
(Bcπ + BυR+ cπtw)γ + bυ(B − πκ)
¯ e(b + Rγ)
. (21b)
Setting B to zero in (21b) shows that the equality can only hold for tw ≤ 0i fa l s o
tp < 0 applies. Given ts = 0, however, the government’s revenue requirement cannot
be warranted if all tax rates are non-positive. Hence, the assumption of tw ≤ 0i sn o t
feasible and tw > 0 has to hold for a suﬃciently low value of B. 
A comparison of Propositions 1 and 6 shows that the introduction of ﬁrm mobil-
ity does not alter the conclusion that the source-based capital tax is not used. The
economic argument that this tax distorts international capital allocation continues to
apply. Assuming that the government cannot use the source-based capital tax in a set-
ting with ﬁrm mobility and setting ts = 0 in (21) does not aﬀect optimal taxing choices.
Introducing a constraint ts = 0 accordingly does not alter the resulting allocation.
Furthermore, Proposition 6 puts into perspective the remaining part of Proposition 1
regarding wage taxation in that ﬁrm mobility may fundamentally change the trade-oﬀs
which tax policy faces. Whereas tp falls on pure proﬁts in the absence of ﬁrm mobility
and, therefore, allows to subsidise wages in order to reduce the adverse labour market
consequences resulting from the informational asymmetry between workers and ﬁrms, the
tax on proﬁts distorts the location decisions of mobile ﬁrms in the extended framework.
Accordingly, the essence of Proposition 6 is that the government may use wage taxation
at a low level of unemployment beneﬁts while proﬁts are taxed or even subsidised to
attract mobile ﬁrms. The economic argument is as follows: a rise in unemployment
beneﬁts has adverse eﬀects on the labour market outcome at a given level of taxes.
To counteract the distortions there are incentives to reduce the wage tax, and to raise
the proﬁt tax, once unemployment beneﬁts become suﬃciently high. Which of the
two conﬂicting eﬀects dominates cannot be ascertained analytically, as equation (21b)
indicates.
The next scenario we consider is related to Proposition 2 in the previous section in
which the wage tax is unavailable:
17Proposition 7 If the government in a small country with mobile ﬁrms is able to choose
tp and ts while wage taxation is restricted and unemployment beneﬁts B are suﬃciently
low, the government will tax capital at source in an eﬃciency wage economy.
Proof: The relevant condition is (20b). Solving the equation for tw =0y i e l d s :
t
s =
fυk ((Bcπ + BυR− ¯ eRtp)γ + b¯ e(Bn− tp − nπκ))
¯ e(cfυυπ +  R)γ + b(¯ e  − πκ)
. (22)
If tp ≤ 0 the government’s revenue requirement will imply ts > 0, since tw =0b y
assumption. If tp > 0a n dB = 0, the numerator of (22) will unambiguously be negative
as fυk > 0. Moreover the denominator is always negative, since γ>0 and the inequalities
in (9) apply. Thus, irrespective of the assumption regarding the sign of tp, ts > 0h o l d s
for a suﬃciently low level of unemployment beneﬁts B. 
In the absence of wage taxation and ﬁrm mobility, the government taxes proﬁts and
uses the proceeds to subsidise capital in order to raise employment. In contrast, if ﬁrms
are mobile, a trade-oﬀ between reducing employment via driving abroad ﬁrms or capital
will arise. This suggests that the source-based capital tax and the proﬁt tax become
strategic complements. The source-based capital tax is positive while the sign of the
proﬁt tax is ambiguous, given a low level of unemployment beneﬁts. Introducing ﬁrm
mobility, thus, reverses the respective ﬁnding of Proposition 2. With mobile ﬁrms it
is potentionally advantageous to rely on capital taxation, even though this causes an
inward shift of the country’s production possibility frontier.17
The ﬁnal scenario we consider is related to Proposition 4 of the previous section in
which the proﬁt tax is presumed not to be available. We then have:
Proposition 8 If the government in a small country with mobile ﬁrms is able to choose
tw and ts while proﬁt taxation is restricted and unemployment beneﬁts B are suﬃciently
low, the government will tax wages in an eﬃciency wage economy.




(fkkk + υfυυ)((Bcπ + BυR+ cπtw)γ + bυ (B − πκ))
β (b + Rγ)k +   ((b + Rγ)υ + cπ)
. (23)
If ts ≤ 0 the government’s revenue requirement implies tw > 0, since tp = 0 by assump-
tion. Moreover, the denominator of (23) is negative, since γ>0 and the inequalities
17Related, Hauﬂer (2001b, pp. 257) shows in a model based on Genser and Hauﬂer (1996) that a
destination-based commodity tax, which is akin to the source-based capital tax in our model, can be
used as a substitute for a missing tax on non-wage income.
18in (9) apply. The ﬁrst term in the numerator of (23) is also negative. Accordingly, for
B = 0 a positive ts requires tw > 0 from condition (23). Thus, irrespective of the assump-
tion regarding the sign of ts, tw > 0 holds for a suﬃciently low level of unemployment
beneﬁts B. 
The above ﬁnding should be contrasted with Proposition 4, according to which capital
will be taxed at source in a setting with immobile ﬁrms while the sign of the wage tax
is ambiguous. In the presence of ﬁrm mobility the wage tax will be positive, while the
tax on capital cannot be signed. The economic reason is that the case for taxation of
capital, as an indirect tax on proﬁts, becomes less clear in the case of ﬁrm mobility.
A positive source-based capital tax lowers employment since such a tax drives capital
and ﬁrms out of the country. A wage tax, despite its more direct negative employment
consequences, only has an indirect impact on proﬁts and capital usage. Accordingly,
ﬁrm mobility re-establishes the unambiguous case for wage taxation.
Finally, it is clear that a simultaneous increase in the level of proﬁt taxation and
the level of source-based capital taxation in all countries would eliminate the negative
eﬀects of tax competition. The argument is that both taxes would be lump-sum if all
countries were uniﬁed in one economy. In this extended form Proposition 5 is also valid
in a framework with ﬁrm mobility.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we analyse tax policy in the presence of unemployment due to eﬃciency
wages and internationally mobile capital. We, furthermore, diﬀerentiate a setting in
which proﬁts can vary from a world in which proﬁts are constant, either due to a con-
stant returns technology or because of perfect international ﬁrm mobility. The present
paper characterises optimal tax rates in each of the diﬀerent cases to gain a better un-
derstanding for the economic forces that shape tax policy in an open economy which
faces unemployment.
The ﬁndings of this paper for an eﬃciency economy under alternative assumptions
regarding ﬁrm mobility and the availability of tax instruments are summarised in Table 2.
Moreover, the table contains information on optimal tax rates in the absence of labour
market imperfetions. First, it is seen from Proposition 4 that the source-based tax on
mobile capital is used when ﬁrms are immobile and positive proﬁt income cannot be
taxed directly due to the absence of proﬁt taxation. This result is robust with respect
to the diﬀerent modelling approaches for the labour market. The economic explanation
for this observation is that the source-based tax on capital ultimatively falls on proﬁts.
19Propo– Taxes Optimal tax rates
sition available ts tp tw
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)( v) (vi)( vii) (viii)( ix)
1. Firms immobile, π>0 1 tp,t s,t w and tp,t w 0( 0 ) +( + )− (0)
2 tp,t s − (0) +( + ) 0( 0 )
4 ts,t w +( + )0( 0 ) +/− (+)
2. Firms immobile, π =0 3 ts,t w 0( 0 )0( 0 )+( + )
3. Firms mobile, π>0 6 tp,t s,t w and tp,t w 0( 0 ) +/− (0) +( + )
7 tp,t s +( + ) +/− (+) 0( 0 )
8 ts,t w +/− (na) 0 (na) + (na)
Notes: columns (iv), (vi) and (viii) display the ﬁndings of our paper, where a +/ − /0 indicates a
positive/negative/zero tax rate. Ambigous signs are indicated by +/−. The sign of the optimal tax
rates if the labour market is competitive are presented in brackets. They are taken from the literature
discussed in the course of the present paper. A (na) indicates that this scenario has not yet been
analysed to our knowledge.
Table 2: Summary of main results.
This clariﬁes that the production ineﬃciency attributed to the source-based capital tax
cannot generally be used as an argument for the absence of capital taxation. Second,
propositions 1, 2 and 4 indicate that there exist environments where the government in
an eﬃciency wage economy chooses to subsidise wages or capital. This result cannot be
observed when the labour market is assumed to be competitive. The conﬂict in results
between our model and those in which labour markets are assumed to be competitive
can be explained by the observation that both the wage and the capital subsidy increase
labour demand by ﬁrms and, thus, serve as a device to counteract the distortions on the
domestic labour market. Interestingly, any capital subsidy is ﬁnanced by proﬁt taxation.
Of course, the use of capital taxation as a corrective device is pointless in the absence
of labour-market distortions.
The remaining set of propositions particularly clariﬁes that the relative importance
of the economic mechanisms described above crucially depends on the precise modelling
of the economic environment. Extending the model by allowing for ﬁrm mobility in-
creases the costs of proﬁt taxation and establishes a case for taxing capital at source
(see Proposition 7), even though the economy is small and perceives world capital supply
to be inﬁnitely elastic. Moreover, wages will always be taxed if ﬁrms are mobile. The
interpretation of the ﬁnding is that the mobility of tax bases renders both the proﬁt tax
20and the capital tax inferior devices to collect tax revenue, even though the wage tax has
a direct negative eﬀect on employment.
It is one of the most general results of the present paper that the welfare costs of
labour market imperfections increase when tax bases become internationally mobile.
The reason is that international capital or ﬁrm mobility impose a downward pressure
on those taxes which are levied on mobile bases, which makes it increasingly diﬃcult
for governments to use ﬁscal policy to counteract the distortions on domestic markets
directly through a reduction of wage taxation. Accordingly, international harmonisation
of capital and proﬁt taxation is a necessary condition for the eﬀective use of ﬁscal policy
to alleviate the negative welfare consequences of unemployment. High unemployment
countries are more likely to proﬁt from measures of tax harmonisation. Hence, these
countries are more likely to support measures of tax harmonisation when the necessary
cooperation between countries is enforced. The empirical evidence summarised in Table 1
is at least consistent with this conclusion.
While this paper has focused on speciﬁc aspects of the interaction of tax competi-
tion with unemployment, many issues are still left for future research. For instance, the
analysis has assumed that individuals are identical. However, we observe heterogeneous
individuals which may diﬀer with respect to their abilities in the real world, and these
diﬀerences should also be taken into account when thinking about tax policy. More-
over, given labour market imperfections, the institutional features of the unemployment
insurance system may have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence (e.g. Pissarides 1998, Richter and
Schneider 2001). The assumption of an exogenous capital supply, which renders the
residence-based capital income taxation lump-sum, may also be an important factor for
the taxing choices. We believe, however, that these potential extensions of the basic
model, while valuable and worth pursuing, are unlikely to change the basic mechanisms
discussed in this paper. For example, when residence-based capital taxation is sustain-
able in a world with endogenous capital supply and decentralized tax setting, then the
source-based capital tax we considered would still be used as an indirect tax on proﬁts
and we would continue to obtain the result that coordination of capital taxes is not a
substitute for domestic reforms. To sum up, the simple workhorse model of the present
paper allows to give an answer to the question through which channels market integration
may intensify the detrimental eﬀects of labour market imperfections.















Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Austria 4.3 3598 109.8 0.031 9 2461187 168015 0.068 4
Belgium 11.7 3802.3 130.4 0.034 6 8483500 587058 0.069 3
Denmark 5.5 2692 74 0.027 11 1026371 51270 0.050 9
Finland 11.4 2183.6 41 0.019 16 609714 20956 0.034 14
France 12.0 23155.5 750.2 0.032 8 7852505 354706 0.045 11
Germany 9.3 37540 1256 0.033 7 3547540 169500 0.048 10
Greece 11.5 3921 82 0.021 15 32635985 1445873 0.044 12
Ireland 7.8 1155.3 57.8 0.050 3 54461.4 2037.1 0.037 15
Italy 11.9 22914.5 633.4 0.028 10 1920288 115770 0.060 6
Luxembourg 2.3 237 24 0.101 1 666118 137717 0.207 1
Netherlands 4.3 6173.1 246.2 0.040 5 717501 42097 0.059 7
Portugal 5.0 4655.7 101.3 0.022 13 17459926 145489 0.008 16
Spain 18.8 14123.5 343.7 0.024 12 82872.1 4370 0.053 8
Sweden 8.5 4072 87 0.021 14 1615329 66490 0.041 13
Switzerland 3.5 3841 201 0.052 2 376974 27000 0.072 2
UK 6.2 27005 1198 0.044 4 755297 46199 0.061 5
Sources:
Unemployment rate: OECD (2001), Labour Force Statistics, 1980-2000. Tables II, unemployed in 1998 as share of civilian labour force.
Total employment and Employment in ‘Financial Intermediation’: OECD (2002), National Accounts of OECD Countries, Vol. 2, 1989-2000.
Tables 9, Total employment in thousand persons. For Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain: full time equivalents are available and
used. For Ireland only ﬁgures for employees are available. For Switzerland and the UK, data for civilian employees are used, obtained from OECD
(2001), Labour Force Statistics, 1980-2000, Tables IV.
Value-added and value-added in ‘Financial Intermediation’: OECD (2002), National Accounts of OECD Countries, Vol. 2, 1989-2000. Tables 7.
Gross value-added in 1998; Sweden (1996). Data are in current local currency (in millions, except Italy, Spain; billions). For Switzerland, the
value-added for ‘Financial Intermediation’has been estimated to be 25% of the sector ‘Financial Intermediation, Real Estate, Renting and Business
Activities’ since data for ‘Financial Intermediation’ are not available. (OECD (2001), Labour Force Statistics, 1980-2000, p. 275).
Shares and Ranks: own calculations. Countries with ranks 1-5 (6-10/11-16) are found in the ﬁrst (second/third) column of rows three (number of
employees) and four (value-added) of Table 1 in the main text of Section 1.
2
2B Appendix: Firm mobility
The equilibrium condition for the labour market is bκn = a(1−κn). Using this condition
in equation (6) of the main text gives










Using (A.1) and proceeding along the lines described in the main text to derive (8) shows
V
en(¯ e)=k +















From the proﬁt deﬁnition and (A.1) we obtain the following ﬁrst-order conditions









w =0 , (A.3a)
(k) : fk − R − t
s =0 . (A.3b)
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Inspection of the matrix on the l.h.s. of (A.4) shows that the determinant is strictly
positive when gross proﬁts are positive. The latter implies that the inequalities in (9)






> 0. Applying Cramer’s
rule to (A.4) we get
nts = −
bβ
c(1 − κn)2 ˜ H
,n tp = −
bυfkk
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,n tw = ktw = πts = πtw = πtp =0 . (A.5)
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